In the Paralogisms of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant challenges the possibility of a priori knowledge of the self. Implicit in this attack is a positive theory of mind which is comprehensible only through a reading of the Transcendental Deduction. There Kant argues that the possibility of experience requires that experience be represented as had by a Cartesian Ego, since only the representation of such a unitary subject can provide the necessary framework for representing a coherent course of experiences. (...) That the self is represented as a Cartesian Ego, however, does not warrant the claim that the self is in fact simple, substantial, unitary, or immaterial. This reading of the Subjective Deduction is contrasted with Kitcher's reading, and it is tied to Kant's Objective Deduction through a consideration and defense of Strawson's restatement of Kant's own argument. I apply this interpretation of Kant's theory of the self to each of the four Paralogisms, correcting misreadings of the first two by Bennett and Chisholm. I suggest that Kant's account of persons in the Third Paralogism supplies the connection between the Kant's epistemic and moral selves. Finally, I relate the Fourth Paralogism to the first three, considering the extent to which Kant's response to the mind/body problem is "functionalist". (shrink)